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SAROKIN, Circuit Judge: 
 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines are lenient in prescribing 
what a court may consider in determining the appropriate 
sentence.  Although a court may consider information which would 
be inadmissible at the guilt phase, such information must have 
sufficient indicia of reliability to justify the court's reliance 
upon it.   
 In a drug case, the amount of drugs involved has a 
substantial impact upon the severity of the punishment. 
Accordingly the need for sufficient indicia of reliability is 
particularly manifest when findings regarding the quantity of 
drugs are predicated upon evidence which standing alone does not 
meet the higher standard of admissibility. 
 In the instant case, the defendant was convicted of a drug 
conspiracy after lending a small sum of money to his cousin for 
the purchase of cocaine and driving him to the site of the 
transaction.  After conviction, the court increased the 
defendant's sentence based on the amount of drugs involved.  We 
conclude that the hearsay evidence upon which the court relied in 
this matter, which was in direct conflict with the sworn 
testimony of the source, does not meet the test of reliability, 
and hold that the government did not meet its burden of 
establishing that Mr. Brothers knew the quantity of drugs 
involved in the transaction.  Accordingly, the judgment of 
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sentence will be vacated and remanded to the district court for 
resentencing. 
 
I. Facts and procedural posture 
 
 On August 10, 1993, Clayton S. Brothers received a telephone 
call from his cousin, Torrance Cosom.  Mr. Cosom had been 
negotiating a deal to purchase ten kilograms of cocaine for 
several days, for the price of $19,000 a kilo, or $190,000 
overall.  Mr. Cosom was supposed to meet with the alleged seller, 
Anthony Resto, and was calling to borrow the balance of the 
payment from his cousin.  Mr. Cosom contends that he borrowed 
$6000 from his cousin; Mr. Brothers maintains that the amount was 
$3000. 
 In either event, Mr. Brothers agreed to Mr. Cosom's request, 
and lent him money.  At his cousin's request, Mr. Brothers then 
drove him to the site where the deal was to be completed.  When 
they arrived at the location, Mr. Cosom met with Mr. Resto by the 
trunk of the car, where the money was kept.  They took the money 
to the back seat of the car, allegedly to complete the 
transaction. 
 Unfortunately for the two cousins, however, Mr. Resto was a 
witness cooperating with the government, and agents of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation were monitoring the exchange. 
After an amount of time sufficient to collect the evidence they 
needed, the FBI agents descended on the scene and arrested 
Messrs. Cosom and Brothers.  Mr. Cosom promptly pledged 
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cooperation and asked how he could help himself.  Appendix at 
100a.  An FBI agent interrogated him, and in those conversations 
Mr. Cosom gave an account of Mr. Brothers's involvement in the 
transaction.  Most relevant for our purposes here, Mr. Cosom 
claimed that Mr. Brothers was fully aware of the quantity of 
drugs at stake. 
 Messrs. Cosom and Brothers were not arrested at the time, 
but were placed under arrest later on and indicted for conspiracy 
to possess with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 
U.S.C. § 846(a), attempt to possess with intent to distribute 
cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1), and 
aiding and abetting, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2.  Mr. Cosom was 
also charged with two counts of possession of a firearm by a 
previously convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1).   
 Both men pled guilty to one count of violating 21 U.S.C. 
§846(a).  Mr. Cosom was sentenced to ten years in prison. 
However, a dispute arose during Mr. Brothers's sentencing as to 
whether Mr. Brothers was aware of the amount of drugs to be 
purchased by his cousin.  The effect of such knowledge would be 
to significantly increase Mr. Brothers's sentence.  The 
presentence investigation report concluded on the basis of Mr. 
Cosom's earlier statement that Mr. Brothers knew of his cousin's 
intent to purchase ten kilograms of cocaine.  Through counsel, 
Mr. Brothers objected to the attribution of the drug weight to 
him. 
 A sentencing hearing ensued in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, at which Mr. 
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Brothers called Mr. Cosom to testify.  Under oath, Mr. Cosom 
repeatedly asserted that Mr. Brothers never knew the amount of 
cocaine involved in the failed transaction.  The government 
called the FBI agent who had initially interviewed Mr. Cosom. The 
agent testified to his interview with Mr. Cosom, and in 
particular to Mr. Cosom's statement that Mr. Brothers knew the 
amount involved in the transaction. 
 At the conclusion of the hearing, the court announced its 
conclusion that based on the evidence presented a transaction of 
over five kilograms was foreseeable to Mr. Brothers. Accordingly, 
he sentenced Mr. Brothers to 70 months imprisonment and five 
years supervised release. 
 Mr. Brothers now appeals his sentence on the grounds that 
the evidence was insufficient to support the court's conclusion 
that the appellant knew or should have known that the transaction 
negotiated by his co-conspirator involved more than five 
kilograms of cocaine.  In particular, Mr. Brothers argues that 
Mr. Cosom's statement attributing such knowledge to him, which 
Mr. Cosom contradicted in the sentencing hearing, lacked 





 The district court had jurisdiction over the criminal 
prosecution of Mr. Brothers for violations of laws of the United 
States pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.   
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 We have jurisdiction over this appeal from the district 
court's final judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
III. Standard of review 
 
 With respect to the district court's findings of fact, the 
government bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  Miele, 989 F.2d at 663; United States v. McDowell, 888 
F.2d 285, 290 (3d Cir. 1989).  We review these findings to 
determine whether they are clearly erroneous.  Miele, 989 F.2d at 
663; McDowell, 888 F.2d at 291-92.  However, we conduct plenary 
review of questions of law, such as the admissibility of hearsay 
statements. 
 
IV. The "sufficient indicia of reliability" standard 
 
 The use of hearsay in making findings for purposes of 
Guidelines sentencing violates neither the Sentencing Reform Act 
of 1984 nor the Due Process Clause.  United States v. Sciarrino, 
884 F.2d 95, 98 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 997 (1989); 
United States v. Inigo, 925 F.2d 641, 660 (3d Cir. 1991).  The 
sentencing court can give a high level of credence to hearsay 
statements, going so far as to "credit hearsay evidence over 
sworn testimony, especially where there is other evidence to 
corroborate the inconsistent hearsay statement."  U.S. v. Miele, 
989 F.2d 659, 664 (3d Cir. 1993).  However, in order to avoid 
"misinformation of constitutional magnitude," Sciarrino, 884 F.2d 
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at 97, we require that "information used as a basis for 
sentencing under the Guidelines . . . have 'sufficient indicia of 
reliability to support its probable accuracy.'"  Miele, 989 F.2d 
at 663; see also United States v. Torres, 926 F.2d 321, 324 (3d 
Cir. 1991) (noting necessity that information upon which 
Guidelines sentences are based be reliable).  The Sentencing 
Guidelines themselves provide: 
In resolving any reasonable dispute concerning a factor 
important to the sentencing determination, the court 
may consider relevant information without regard to its 
admissibility under the rules of evidence applicable at 
trial, provided that the information has sufficient 
indicia of reliability to support its probable 
accuracy. 
U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a) (1995).  The commentary to § 6A1.3 further 
provides: 
In determining the relevant facts, sentencing judges 
are not restricted to information that would be 
admissible at trial.  18 U.S.C. § 3661.  Any 
information may be considered, so long as it has 
"sufficient indicia of reliability to support its 
probable accuracy."  Reliable hearsay evidence may be 
considered.  Out-of-court declarations by an 
unidentified informant may be considered "where there 
is good cause for the nondisclosure of his identity and 
there is sufficient corroboration by other means." 
U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a), Commentary.  We have held that "this 
standard ["sufficient indicia of reliability"] should be applied 
rigorously."  Miele, 989 F.2d at 664. 
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 In Miele, we vacated the sentence imposed on the defendant 
because the statements used to support the factual findings for 
sentencing were found to fall short of the "sufficient indicia of 
reliability" standard.  The statement at issue, involving the 
quantities of drugs transacted by the defendant, was from the 
testimony of Frank Habera, an informant and drug addict at the 
time of the events in question.  We outlined three flaws in the 
district court's reliance on Mr. Habera's statement.  First, we 
found that "[t]he vast disparity between Habera's estimate in the 
PSI and the significantly lower estimates he provided at the co-
defendants' trial casts doubt on the reliability of the PSI's 
estimate, particularly in view of Habera's status as an addict 
informant."  Id. at 664.  Second, "the district court did not 
address the inconsistency between Habera's various estimates, and 
did not explain why it apparently followed Habera's hearsay 
estimate in the PSI rather than the lower estimates Habera 
provided under oath . . . ."  Id.  Third, "no other witnesses 
testified as to specific drug quantities."  Id. at 65.  While 
there was ample evidence of Miele's "extensive and continued" 
involvement with cocaine, we found that "a determination that 
Miele's drug activity was substantial does not translate readily 
into a specific drug quantity finding, which is the ultimate 
issue for sentencing purposes."  Id. at 668.  In light of the 
inconsistencies in Mr. Habera's statements, the district court's 
failure to explain its adoption of the PSI statement over that 
under oath, and "the lack of other corroborating evidence to 
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support Habera's hearsay estimate," id. at 665, we vacated the 
sentence and remanded for further factfinding.  Id. at 668. 
 As the Third Circuit has emphasized in the past, we should 
exercise particular scrutiny of factual findings relating to 
amounts of drugs involved in illegal operations, since "the 
quantity of drugs attributed to the defendant usually will be the 
single most important determinant of his or her sentence." United 
States v. Collado, 975 F.2d 985, 995 (3d Cir. 1992).  This 
mandate is only reinforced when the court seeks to attribute the 
quantity of drugs to an accomplice. 
Accomplice attribution often results in a dramatic 
increase in the amount of drugs for which the defendant 
is held accountable, which translates directly into a 
dramatic increase in the sentence.  As we have 
explained, whether an individual defendant may be held 
accountable for amounts of drugs involved in reasonably 
foreseeable transactions conducted by co-conspirators 
depends upon the degree of the defendant's involvement 
in the conspiracy.  In assessing the defendant's 
involvement, courts must consider whether the amounts 
distributed by the defendant's co-conspirators were 
distributed "in furtherance of the . . . jointly-
undertaken . . . activity," were "within the scope of 
the defendant's agreement," and were "reasonably 
foreseeable in connection with the criminal activity 
the defendant agreed to undertake."  U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, 
application note 1.  We wish to emphasize that in 
deciding whether accomplice attribution is appropriate, 
it is not enough to merely determine that the 
defendant's criminal activity was substantial.  Rather, 
a searching and individualized inquiry into the 
circumstances surrounding each defendant's involvement 
in the conspiracy is critical to ensure that the 
defendant's sentence accurately reflects his or her 
role. 
Id.  This standard applies in particular when the court seeks to 
determine "whether a particular defendant may be held accountable 
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for amounts of drugs involved in transactions conducted by a co-
conspirator."  Id. at 992. 
V. The district court's analysis 
 
 The court relied on certain factual findings in sentencing 
Mr. Brothers.  One central finding, which is in dispute here, is 
that Mr. Brothers had knowledge of the quantities of cocaine 
involved in the transaction that was to take place on August 10, 
1993.  To reach its conclusion, the court relied on hearsay 
testimony by FBI Special Agent Bud Warner reporting alleged 
statements by Mr. Cosom imputing such knowledge to Mr. Brothers. 
As in Miele, Mr. Cosom contradicted his earlier, unsworn 
statement when he testified under oath at Mr. Brothers's 
sentencing hearing.  As in Miele, there was no other witness to 
corroborate the facts alleged in Mr. Cosom's earlier statement. 
The court, however, found that elements in the record constituted 
sufficient corroborating evidence to admit Agent Warner's hearsay 
testimony and, on that basis, the court chose to credit Mr. 
Cosom's earlier, unsworn statement over his later statements 
under oath. 
A. The inconsistent statements 
 During Clayton Brothers's sentencing hearing, the government 
called as a witness Special Agent Bud Warner, the FBI agent in 
the case.  Mr. Warner testified that he took Mr. Cosom into his 
custody on the day of the attempted drug sale, Appendix at 60a, 
that Mr. Cosom waived his constitutional rights, "stated that he 
did not want to be arrested and prosecuted for this crime," and 
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that "he would cooperate fully with the FBI."  Id.; see also id. 
at 100a (Federal Bureau of Investigation report, Aug. 24, 1993) 
("COSOM stated that he did not want to go to jail and inquired as 
to how he could help himself.").  According to Mr. Warner, Mr. 
Cosom told him that day that "Mr. Brothers was fully aware that 
they were -- he was to pick up ten kilograms of cocaine that 
day."  Id. at 61a.  Mr. Cosom did not disavow this statement in 
subsequent proffer sessions.  Id. at 50a. 
 However, Mr. Cosom's own testimony during the sentencing 
hearing contradicted the statement he allegedly made to Mr. 
Warner.  When asked if Mr. Brothers knew prior to the deal that 
Mr. Cosom intended to purchase ten kilograms of cocaine, Mr. 
Cosom replied, "He never knew the amount."  Id. at 40a; see also 
id. at 49a ("I don't think he knew about the ten.  He knew I was 
going to meet somebody about the coke, though."); id. at 52a ("He 
knew I was going to buy it, but he didn't know, you know, how 
many, the amount."); id. at 54a (THE COURT: "Did he know how much 
money you had?"; MR. COSOM: "No, I don't believe so."); id. at 
56a (Q: "[I]s it your recollection that [Mr. Brothers] knew or 
did not know the amount of drugs you were going to buy on the 
date of this incident?"' A: "He didn't know.").1 
                                                           
1
  The government suggests that Mr. Cosom admitted at Mr. 
Brothers's sentencing hearing that Mr. Brothers knew of the 
quantity involved.  Appellee's Brief at 4.  The government's 
claim is based on the following exchange:  
 THE COURT: And he [Mr. Brothers] knew you were 
going down there to buy the ten K, right? 
 MR. COSOM: Yes. 
Appendix at 55a.  Taken out of context, this exchange could 
indeed support the government's claim.  In context, however, it 
is clear that Mr. Cosom was commenting not on Mr. Brothers's 
13 
B. The court's assessment 
 Near the conclusion of the hearing, the court announced its 
decision on the issue, which we cite here verbatim: 
 All right.  I've given a considerable amount of 
thought to this case and I think the bottom line is 
that I'd be closing my eyes to the obvious if I were to 
find that the calculation by the probation officer here 
was inaccurate. 
 
 It seems to me based on the facts we have before 
us that, first of all, the scope of the conspiracy was 
to buy a large amount of cocaine, in this case ten 
kilograms, and that it was reasonably foreseeable to 
Mr. Brothers, who knew the defendant, was a cousin of 
the defendant, had had prior dealings with him, it was 
reasonably foreseeable for him to suspect that there 
was going to be a great deal more than five kilograms 
purchased.  And part of that is based upon, as I said, 
the knowledge he has of Mr. Cosom. 
 
 The other part is based upon the obvious 
quantities of money that were involved here, that made 
it clear that the amount he was contributing was but a 
small portion of a large amount that was going to be 
used to purchase a substantial amount of drugs.  And I 
think it's clearly foreseeable that that amount was 
over five kilograms. 
 
 The other facts which support that are the 
testimony of Mr. Cosom and the -- as well as the 
statements he's made in the past, which I tend to 
believe the statements he made in the past were more 
accurate than those he made today in the presence of 
his cousin.  And therefore I find that the base offense 
level of 32 is correct. 
Appendix at 78a-79a. 
 Based on the court's statement, it appears that the court 
relied primarily on two factors in crediting Mr. Cosom's hearsay 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
knowledge of the quantity involved but on his knowledge of the 
purpose of the trip.  Right after that exchange, Mr. Brothers's 
attorney jumped in to ask Mr. Cosom, "So that I'm clear, did -- 
is it your recollection that my client knew or did not know the 
amount of drugs you were going to buy on the date of this 
incident,?" id. at 56a, to which Mr. Cosom responded, "He didn't 
know."  Id. 
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statements over those he made under oath, at the sentencing 
hearing: (a) Mr. Brothers's knowledge of Mr. Cosom through their 
family relationship and prior dealings; (b) the quantities of 
money involved. 
C. The corroborating evidence 
 The district court relied on two elements as corroborating 
evidence for Mr. Cosom's statement attributing to Mr. Brothers 
knowledge of the quantities of cocaine involved in the failed 
transaction of August 10, 1993: the personal relationship between 
the two men, and Mr. Brothers's presence at the site of the deal. 
1. Mr. Brothers's knowledge of Mr. Cosom 
 The first element on which the court allegedly relied was 
the existing relationship between Messrs. Brothers and Cosom. 
There is simply nothing in the relationship that could constitute 
corroborating evidence for the claim that Mr. Brothers knew the 
quantities involved in the planned purchase on August 10, 1993. 
There is nothing about the fact that the two men are cousins that 
would indicate to Mr. Brothers that Mr. Cosom intended to 
purchase ten kilograms of cocaine.   
 As for Mr. Brothers's knowledge of Mr. Cosom's past history 
of drug dealing, far from supporting the government's position, 
it undermines it.  The government points out in its brief that 
"Cosom [had] supplied Brothers with 4.5 ounce quantities of 
cocaine on three separate occasions."  Appellee's Brief at 17; 
see also Appendix at 44-45a, 51-52a.  If anything, the fact that 
Mr. Brothers's past drug transactions with Mr. Cosom involved 
relatively small amounts supports the position that it was not 
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reasonably foreseeable for him to expect that the August 10 
transaction would involve ten kilograms of cocaine.  While it is 
true that Mr. Cosom started buying kilogram quantities of cocaine 
in the Fall of 1991, Appendix at 49a, there is nothing in the 
record to indicate that Mr. Brothers knew of that fact. 
2. The sums of money involved 
 The second piece of corroborating evidence mentioned by the 
court is the sums of money involved in the transaction.  The 
amount involved, in and of itself, indicates nothing about Mr. 
Brothers's knowledge of the quantity of drugs involved.  A 
correlation can only be made if Mr. Brothers knew how much money 
was involved, and if from that knowledge he could reasonably 
foresee the quantity of cocaine involved.  The various elements 
from which such knowledge might be imputed include: (1) Mr. 
Brothers's loan to Mr. Cosom; (2) the conversation between Mr. 
Cosom and the government informer, Anthony Resto, during the 
transaction; (3) the presence of the bags containing the money in 
the car; and (4) Mr. Brothers's statement supporting his cousin's 
representation to the government informant that all the money was 
there. 
 First, no knowledge of the quantity of cocaine involved can 
be imputed from the amounts of money that Mr. Brothers lent Mr. 
Cosom.  The court found that the amount of the loan was $6000, 
which according to Agent Warner would suffice for a wholesale 
purchase of "probably a quarter kilo of cocaine."  Appendix at 
69a.  There is no reason to conclude that, based on his loan of 
$6000 to his cousin, Mr. Brothers could somehow foresee that the 
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total amount of the transaction -- $190,000 -- was more than 
thirty times that amount. 
 Second, the conversation between Messrs. Cosom and Resto, as 
it is transcribed in the record, cannot support such a finding 
either.  The government states that "[i]n the consensual 
recording of the August 10 meeting, Cosom, referring to the cash-
laden gym bag, told Resto, in the presence of Brothers, that, 
'There's two hundred there.'"  Appellee's Brief at 15.  The 
transcript of the recording indicates that the following exchange 
took place: 
AR: You got it a lot of bags? 
 
TC: Only in one big bag. 
 
AR: Well, just put it in the car. 
 
TC: What car?  Your car? 
 
 AR: No, your car. 
 
TC: I ran it. 
 
AR:I know, but I don't want to be reachin in 
the trunk, you know what I'm sayin'. 
 
TC: Oh, you want me to put the money in it. 
 
AR:Yeah, just put it in the back seat.  Fuck 
it. Put it, just put it in the back seat like 
this. 
 
TC: You sit in it. 
 
TC: There's two hundred there. 
 
 AR: What's up, aye? 
 
CB: I'm Jake, man. 
Appendix at 96a-97a.  We know that the following sequence of 
events occurred:  Messrs. Cosom and Resto went to the trunk of 
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Mr. Cosom's car to look at the two bags containing the money, and 
they took those bags to the back seat of Mr. Cosom's car.  The 
whole time, Mr. Brothers was sitting in the driver's seat of Mr. 
Cosom's car.  What we don't know is how the images fit with the 
soundtrack -- i.e., the transcript.  That is, we don't know where 
the participants were when certain words were said.  In 
particular, we do not know where Messrs. Cosom and Resto were 
when Mr. Cosom told Mr. Resto, "There's two hundred there."  They 
could have been in the back seat, audible to Mr. Brothers; they 
could just as easily have been standing outside the car, having 
just put the bags inside, and beyond Mr. Brothers's auditive 
reach.  (Messrs. Brothers and Resto did not greet each other 
until after this exchange.)  There is simply no way to favor one 
scenario over the other, and no support for the government's 
claim that "the transcript of the August 10 meeting, read in 
context, establishes that Brothers was present at the time Resto 
placed the money in the back seat of the vehicle and Cosmo 
advised him that there was $200,000 present there."  Appellee's 
Brief at 22.  Therefore, because there is no way to conclude that 
Mr. Brothers did hear the reference to "the two hundred," we find 
that the exchange could not constitute an indicia of reliability 
for Mr. Warner's hearsay statement.  (Furthermore, as Mr. 
Brothers rightly argues in his brief, "Cosom could just as easily 
have been pointing to a bundle which contained two hundred 
dollars."  Appellant's Reply Brief at 5.) 
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 Messrs. Cosom and Resto had a second conversation regarding 
money during the attempted drug purchase, this one clearly in the 
presence of Mr. Brothers. 
AR: What, what this in staacks [sic] of bill? 
 
 TC: Hum? 
 
 AR: I'm sayin, I'm sayin. . . 
 
 TC: These five, these five. 
 
 AR: Oh, alright, man. 
 
 AR: Five "G's." 
 
 TC: There's two bags.  There's another bag under that.  See 
it?  It's a white bag. 
 
 CB: Yeah, with the ink stains. 
 
 AR: This is what? 
 
 TC: That's five.  Five grand. 
 
 AR: Five. 
 
 TC: That's a grand, that's a grand.  (unintelligible) 
 
 AR: Five. 
 
 TC: Five.  Five, five, five, five. 
Appendix at 97-98a. 
 Again, with just the sound and no image, it is impossible to 
infer from this exchange any knowledge on the part of Mr. 
Brothers.  We do not know whether he was looking at the other 
protagonists as the conversation was taking place; and if he was, 
we do not know what he could and could not see, or whether or not 
the various stacks were in his line of vision. 
 The third possible indication that Mr. Brothers had 
knowledge of the sum of money involved, and could therefore 
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reasonably foresee the quantity of drugs at stake, is the 
presence of the two money-filled bags in the back of the car. 
Again, though, there is no evidence that Mr. Brothers had a full 
view of the bags, that he could translate what he could see into 
an approximate sum of money, and that he could establish a 
correlation between the estimated sum of money and the quantity 
of drugs it could purchase.  The cost of buying just under five 
kilograms of cocaine at the time of the failed transaction was 
close to $100,000.   Even that amount, in small enough 
denominations -- say $10, $20 or even $50 bills -- would have 
taken up quite a bit of space.  The presence of the two bags, 
therefore, was not corroborating evidence for Mr. Warner's 
hearsay statement.  (There is also no evidence that photographs 
of the two bags open, with the money clearly visible, correspond 
to the state of the bags when they were within Mr. Brothers's 
sight.)  
 Finally, the fourth possible evidence is a statement by Mr. 
Brothers during the transaction.  An exchange took place during 
which Mr. Resto was trying to ensure that all the money he was to 
receive for payment was contained in the two bags. 
AR: But it ain't short, right? 
 
 TC: It ain't short. 
 
 CB: He said it's right, man. 
Appendix at 98a.  This does not necessarily represent evidence of 
Mr. Brothers' personal knowledge of the amount involved, but more 
likely, as Mr. Brothers contends, a statement that "merely 
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evinces support for Cosom and a desire to conclude a deal." 
Appellant's Brief at 16. 
D. The more reliable statement 
 The district court gave one final reason for its finding 
regarding Mr. Brothers's knowledge of the quantity of drugs 
involved: "I tend to believe the statements [Mr. Cosom] made in 
the past were more accurate than those he made today in the 
presence of his cousin."  Appendix at 79a. 
 Of course, assessments of credibility by the trial court are 
entitled to great deference at the appellate level.  However, the 
past statement of Mr. Cosom, reported as hearsay by Agent Warner, 
lacked "sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable 
accuracy" and therefore could not support the court's conclusion 
regarding Mr. Brothers's knowledge of the amount of drugs 
involved.  There was simply no occasion for the court to compare 
the credibility of a hearsay statement that was not properly 
admitted with that of another statement made under oath. 
 We note, however, that both sides have commented on the 
issue of the statements' respective credibility.  We are not 
persuaded by the government's description of Mr. Cosom's earlier 
statement as "made at a time when Cosom had no motive to protect 
his cousin or to fabricate falsehoods."  Appellee's Brief at 11. 
Mr. Cosom's earlier statement was made right after he "inquired 
as to how he could help himself."  Appendix at 100a.  There is a 
motive right there: in the context of this case, it seems no less 
plausible that Mr. Cosom would make up certain facts that could 
be of use to the police against an accomplice in order to reduce 
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a certain prison sentence than that he would lie on the stand and 




 Because of Mr. Cosom's inconsistent statements and the lack 
of "sufficient indicia of credibility" for Mr. Warner's hearsay 
testimony, the district court committed clear error under Miele 
when it used as a basis for its sentencing of Mr. Brothers the 
information contained in Mr. Cosom's earlier statement. 
Therefore, we vacate the judgment of sentence and will remand to 
the district court for resentencing in accordance with this 
opinion. 
 
